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1. INTRODUCTION 
The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, better known as the 
Brundtland report, has been a prominent eye-opener with regard to the dual relation between 
environment and development. It point out how economie growth and the quality of growth 
are influenced by the ecological issue. Besides, it shows how ecological devastation in many 
developing countries is amplifïed by poverty-led behaviour and by the need to secure foreign 
exchange. Production of primary export commodities is often linked with environmental 
damage. The current debt situation and adjustment policies force countries to increase their 
production of export commodities with simultaneously a further pressure on the biophysical 
environment. It is for this reason that the Commission expressed "the need for more effective 
instruments to integrate environment and development concerns into international trading 
patterns". (WCED 1987:84). 
It becomes increasingly clear that environmental degradation does not respect national bor-
ders. From the present state of knowledge about a number of global environmental problems 
- a weakening 'green lung' capacity of tropical rain forests, perforation of the ozone layer and 
global warming, dwindling of species, and pollution of oceans with potential far-reaching 
implications for oxygen production by plankton - it emerges that international co-ordination 
and action is urgently needed. It is likely that the 1990s will see an intensification of attempts 
to integrate costs of environmental preservation and natural resource use in regular interna-
tional price systems. 
This paper is a contribution to that discussion. It argues that the creation of such an econom-
ie instrument is feasible for the most important export sector of developing countries, viz. 
exports of primary commodities to OECD countries. This economie device, labeled Interna-
tional Commodity and Environment Agreement, builds upon the remnants of 'traditional' 
commodity agreements but is, unlike the latter, not concerned with price stabiüsation. It aims 
primarily at integration of environmental externalities in the commodity prices paid by 
OECD countries. v 
Bcfore describing this instrument, some attention will be given to ecological damage associat-
ed with Third World production of export commodities, to attempts to valuate this damage, 
and to theoretical insights on integration of environmental externahties in price systems. 
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2. PRODUCTION OF EXPORT COMMODITIES AND ENVIRONMENT 
The period of low prices since 1980 urged many countries to produce and export larger 
volumes of primary commodities in order to finance their import needs and debt. Prescrip-
tions to increase commodity exports often fonned part of the IMF readjustment package for 
countries with debt problems, thus contributing to further international supply imbalance and 
depression of export commodity prices. In a basic policy document on Sub-Saharan Africa the 
World Bank calls on these countries to increase their commodity exports in spite of depressed 
world markets. ' Export diversification programs are difficult to realize and can work only in 
the longer term. Many countries tried to shift towards downstream activities in the production 
chain (industrial processing of primary products) in order to improve their export earnings. 
Slow progress in this field can partly be explained by a limited propensity to invest in these 
activities by foreign companies, by technological problems, by the structure of international 
marketing and distribution of processed commodities, and in some case, by tariff escalation in 
OECD countries. In the foreseeable future commodity production remains a vital export 
sector for a vast majority of developing countries. ' 
Some ecological effects of production of primary-commodities have become a matter of 
international concern by now. This holds for the destructive effects of déforestation in the 
Amazon region and in South-East Asia. Most of this damage is caused for export of tropical 
hardwood logs, production of mineral resources with export destinations, and extensive cattle 
ranching, mostly producing for meat exports '. According to the FAO agricultural extension 
for export-oriented agroindustry (e.g. groundnuts) can be accounted for 70 percent of Sub-
Saharan déforestation. (Le Prestre 1989:170). Cattle ranching for export of meat or live 
animals is also a cause of overgrazing and soil erosion in many arid zones. (Myers & Tucker 
1987). Overintense fishing of coastal waters and deep sea areas, often by international fishery 
companies, negatively affects the regeneration capacity of these eco-spheres. Sometimes it 
devastates the coral reefs and the sea bottom. (Swaminathan 1987). 
The production of cash crops like soya, cocoa, coffee, cotton, tobacco, rubber, and sugar cane 
is often linked with abundant use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, especially when 
production units are large. Often forests are destroyed by agricultural extension to grow these 
1) "If Africa's economies are to grow, they must earn foreign exchange to pay for essential imports. Thus it is vital 
that they increase their share of world markets. The prospects for most primary commodities are poor, so higher 
export earnings must come from increased output, diversification into new commodities and an aggressive export 
drive into the rapidly growing Asian markets". (World Bank 1989b:13). In the light of recent historical experience 
these World Bank proposals seem questionable. (Kox 1990). 
2) In 1988 primary commodities (including oil) accounted for more than half of total exports in 108 developing 
countries. In 88 countries the dependency percentage amounted even to more than 70 percent of total exports. 
(Unctad 1990a). 
3) Export production is not always the only reason for déforestation. In some countries (e.g. Brazil) déforestation 
is also caused by a skewed division of land and by a government policy (e.g. Indonesia) favouring agricultural 
extension in remote forest regions by domestic settlers. 
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products. Intensive use of agrochemicals contributes heavily to pollution of the subsoil and 
surface waters. Moreover, it has cumulative long-term effects in the form of pesticide residu-
als in animal and human food chains, a diminishing biodiversity, soil erosion and falling 
ground water levels. The latter two consequences are in their turn important causes of deser-
tification. (Redclift 1989; Barbier 1989; Mortimore 1989; Van Amstel et all. 1986; Pearce et 
all. 1990). 
Export mining also contributes to soil erosion by demolition of vegetation and soil structure, 
especially in the case of open-cast mining (copper, tin, zinc, bauxite). Other metal mining 
activities create giant waste heaps or dispose toxic wastes and polluted run-off. (Blunden 
1985). 
Ecological effects of commodity production are feit mostly by the local population in produc-
ing countries, either directly or in the long run. Lagged effects such as soil erosion, or exhaus-
tion of soil and water resources, manifest themselves through regular 'natural' catastrophes 
(land slides, floods, large forest fïres, or drought). Similarly, the may appear in the form of a 
slow process of falling agricultural yields, causing rural impoverishment, departure for urban 
shanty towns, and depopulation of rural areas. Direct economie consequences of deforesta-
tion are not confined to the depletion of future timber sources. It also produces the disap-
pearance non-timber means of existence for the local populations like medicinal and aromatic 
herbs, barks (e.g. quinquina), fibers, flowers, resins, fats, and other forest products. 
Only a small part of harmful ecological side effects of commodity production trickles down 
along the international trade chain to the commodity-importing countries. This may have the 
form of residues of pesticides, herbicides or fungicides in agricultural commodities. These 
make themselves feit as heaith hazards for harbour, transport and manufacturing workers 
and, ultimately, also for consumers in importing countries. 
Other, less direct effects of large-scale environmental degradation in developing countries, 
like those mentioned in the introduction, are only recently receiving international attention. 
These long-term, cumulative effects are transnational in character and can only be tackled by 
international co-operation. 
Valuation of damage 
If environmental externalities of export production are to be integrated in international 
commodity prices, exercises to quantify the costs of environmental degradation in the mone-
tary dimension are indispensable. Several methods exist for measuring the costs of environ-
mental damage. Each offers a different approach for tackling the quantification problems. 
Three central problems arise. Firstly, ecological effects have no natural unity of measure. 
This specially applies to influence on amenities. Secondly, environmental effects both have 
the character of externalities and of public goods: they represent no private property, are not 
sold in markets and their value cannot be assessed in a direct way. The third and perhaps 
most important issue is that ecological effects, due to their complexity, uncertainty, and to the 
far from complete knowledge about the complex ecosystems, can hardly be forecasted. 
(Turner, 1988). Non-linearity of ecological relations means that sudden vehement reactions 
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can occur due to small, gradual changes. ' 
Some methods base their estimates upon valuations derived from revealed or stated prefer-
ences of individual consumers. (Nash & Bowers 1988). Because of the public goods character 
of ecological effects such valuation efforts seem less appropriate. Moreover, using these 
methods assumes a large degree of discretionary consumer choice, which is scarcely available 
at the low absolute income levels prevailing in most developing nations. Preferences are 
influenced by income and knowledge levels, not only between individuals, but also between 
nations. Even if "The Polluter Pays", the admission to dump heavily polluted chemical waste 
in a poor African country, is probably more a function of income and knowledge than a func-
tion of 'autonomous' preferences. The willingness-to-be-compensated is therefore a danger-
ous Standard for ecological valuation attempts in situations where large differences in income 
and knowledge about long-term effects prevail. 
The method mostly applied for measuring environmental effects in developing countries is 
the alternative costs method. Basically, it tries to valuate unpriced production or resource 
consumption by using related economie variables that already do have a price at this moment, 
though sometimes in a different economie space. (Ahmad 1981; Hufschmidt & Hyman 1982). 
With regard to environmental costs of primary export production two variants of this method 
have been used. 
The first variant basically counts the costs of environmental preservation that would have 
been incurred if the same production would have been undertaken in some other country with 
more advanced environmental regulations. Often the reference country is the United States. 
What is being measured, therefore, is primarily the amount of economized costs ' . By not 
demanding or by not being able to maintain the same ecological standards developing coun-
tries in fact subsidize industries and consumers in OECD countries. Walter & Loudon (1986) 
calculated that OECD countries for their 1980 imports from developing countries would have 
incurred direct pollution control costs of $ 5.5 billion if they had been required to meet the 
environmental standards then prevailing in the United States. If the pollution control expendi-
tures associated with the materials that went into the final product are also counted, the costs 
would have mounted to $ 14.2 billion in 1980. In the same year Third World exports of non-
oil commodities to developed market economies amounted to $ 68 billion (Unctad 1990b), so 
that it is fair to speak of a considerable hidden subsidy. For two reasons the aforementioned 
amounts underestimate the 'real' costs of ecological damage. Firstly, because they do not 
count costs associated with resource depletion, and secondly because cost-price increasing 
environmental regulations in the reference country do not cover all ecological damage. Total 
ecological costs are, therefore, a multiple of the aforementioned amounts. Ironically, this very 
ecological 'comparative cost advantage' of Third World exporters is an argument for OECD 
producers to demand protectionist measures against these imports. (Ford & Runge 1990). In 
1) For example, there have already been a number of unexpected ecological collapses in economically important 
fisheries. (WR1 & IIED 1986; NAS 1986). 
2) Because of its basically microeconomic character the method is also used for locational decisions of transnation-
al companies. (UNCTC 1985). 
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the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations the use of environmental protectionism has been 
widely discussed. 
A second application of the 'alternative costs' method tries to valuate ecological damage by 
counting the commercial costs which will be incurred when the destructed environment has to 
be reshaped in its original condition. Estimates have been made of total costs of timber ex-
traction and forest conversion in Indonesia during 1982. Cost elements include depreciation 
of the forest stock, costs of timber extraction itself (including logging damage and fires), and 
forgone costs of minor forest products. In Repetto, Wells et all. (1987) these costs have been 
estimated at a total of $ 3.1 billion, or about four percent of Indonesian GDP that year. This 
estimate has been criticised as being too low. ' Several studies quantify the cost effects of soil 
erosion in developing countries. (Dasgupta & Maeler 1989). Production of export commodi-
ties is a major, but, of course, not the only cause of soil erosion. ' The United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme (UNEP) estimated the total global cost effects of desertification in arid 
zones at $ 26 billion annually as a consequence of lost agricultural and livestock producti-
vity.(Mortimore 1989). In Mali forgone farmer's incomes due to soil erosion are estimated at 
$ 31 - 123 million annually, which is equal to 4-16 percent of agricultural GDP. (Bishop & 
Allen 1989). On-site costs of soil erosion in upland areas in Java are estimated to amount 
$ 320 million annually, or three percent of agricultural GDP. Counting the costs caused by 
downstream sedimentation of eroded soils would add another $ 25-90 million. (Magrath & 
Arensl987). 
Both variants of the alternative costs method can be criticized in some respects. In case of the 
first method one could remark that a perfect counterfactual case does not exist, so that addi-
tional adjustments have to be made. In case of the second method it is obvious that ecological 
damage will never be solely caused by production of primary export commodities. Moreover, 
cost-benefit methods usually treat irreversible environmental effects of projects no differently 
from more reversible effects, and the practice of using cost-benefit methods has therefore 
been criticised for strongly favouring projects with short-term benefits and long-term costs 
(as is often the case for environmental effects). (Goodland & Ledec 1987). 
Even though some criticism is possible, the estimates made it plausible that ecological costs 
of commodity production are substantial and that the magnitude of the bidden environmental 
subsidy transferred to OECD countries, is far from trivial. This would justify an integration of 
environmental externalities in international commodity prices to be based not only on ecolog-
ical and/or solidarity grounds, but also on economie grounds. 
1) It does not count costs of a decreased protection function of the forest (watershed protection, maintainance of a 
micro climate, biodiversity) and lower potential tourism income. (Barbier 1990). 
2) Large population pressure on the available in a region with limited ecological canying capacity causes similar 
effects. Desintegration of social structures that ensured maintainance of common grounds, also contributed to 
overgrazing and erosion. 
5 
3. CURES AND GROWTH PRIORITIES 
Abatement of ecological devastation in commodity producing countries both bas a stock and 
a flow aspect. The stock aspects centers around the arrears in ecological 'reparations'. The 
flow aspect concentrates on the modalities of a different growth model that incorporates 
ecological preservation at an ongoing basis, while depletion of non-renewable resources is 
minimised. 
Reparation of ecological damage caused by past production of primary export commodities in 
past years, will require ample funds for environmental reconstruction and protection. At a 
national level such funds come more and more into existence in OECD countries. At an 
international scale large fmancial efforts are necessary, but available funds are still limited. 
For years, the spending power of the UNEP Environment Fund amounted to only $ 30 mil-
lion. Intergovernmental negotiations in London (June 1990) produced commitments for the 
ozone layer conservation fund to a total of $ 120 million. Given the extent of overdue recon-
struction requirements such fund proportions are still less than modest. ' The distribution of 
fund contributions is a politically very sensible issue. With respect to transnational pollution 
processes few people will deny that industrialised countries of the OECD will have to bear 
the largest part of the fmancial burden. Given their historical share in pollution processes and 
their current share in consumption of natural resources this is hardly deniable. -* However, 
when it comes to concrete commitments, large industrialised countries fail to face their 
responsibility (e.g. the USA in the case of CC^ emissions). When measured by the number 
of international conferences on environmental issues during the last couple of years, aware-
ness of the need for action against global environmental degradation is manifestly increasing. 
Minor 'reparation funds' and conscience-raising intergovernmental conferences, of which we 
have witnessed quite a couple during last years, cannot but only form a first phase of a much 
more comprehensive restructuring of international economie relations with regard to envi-
ronmental issues. The World Bank3) and UNEP finance a range of specific projects and 
programmes oriented at environmental preservation and reconstruction, but the total amount 
of funds is still limited. These organisations, in co-operation with NGO's and local govern-
ments, can function more powerful as channels for allocation of reparation funds to develop-
1) Ettinger et all. (1990:21-24) estimate the required total annual investment costs for dealing with the greenhouse 
problem at $ 330 billion (of which $ 100 billion to be spent in developing countries) while an additional Climate 
Fund of S 25 billion would be necessary to alleviate developing countries' current financial burden which would 
stem from such investments. The minimal dimension of an emergency facility of the Climate Fund is estimated to 
amount to S 1 billion. Wicke & Hucke (1989:292-304) estimate total annual costs for an 'Ecological Marshall Plan' 
at S 190 billion in 1993, increasing to $ 651 billion in 2013. 
2) In the case of world consumption of commercial energy 70 per cent of which is annually consumed by only one 
fifth of the world's population (WCED 1987). 
3) After much criticism of its support for ecologically harmful programs as the Polonoroeste program (in the Bra-
zilian Amazone region) and the Indonesian transmigration program the World Bank reoriented its lending policy 
in 1987 (Le Prestre 1989). Since then it explicitly announced a 'grcening' of its projects. (Finance & Development, 
Febr.1990). 
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ing regions, if their financial means and their mandate are strengthened. 
The second discussion element is how future growth patterns should look like, in order to 
minimalise ongoing environmental damage and natural resource depletion in commodity 
producing nations. There is relatively broad agreement in literature (Turner 1988; UNCTAD 
1990c; ECE 1990) that four categories of adjustments are required to obtain sustainable 
patterns of development: 
1. development and introduction of production techniques and policy instruments that 
reduce pollution output; 
2. development and introduction of techniques oriented at recycling of waste products 
and non-renewable resources; 
3. minimising total use of non-renewable resources by shifting towards renewable re-
sources (provided that the regenerative capacity of renewable resources is maintained), 
with the proper rate of exploitation of non-renewable resources being related to the 
availability of alternative investment opportunities; ' 
4. reduction of pollutive and natural resource-intensive consumption patterns. 
Worldwide implementation of such adjustments (especially 3 and 4) is unlikely due to a wide 
divergence of interests. Developing countries do not have the same priority ranking as indus-
trialised countries have. Their most import social-economic policy target is to raise the level 
of per capita income and economie growth. For them pressures to curb consumption (4) 
-other than for foreign exchange constraints and growth constraints- form a non-item, unless 
this would be coupled to global redistribution of purchasing power. A similar disagreement 
arises around adjustment category nr. 3. For their economie growth they need investments in 
(often imported) equipment, technology and intermediates, which make export earnings vital. 
In so far as reduction of natural resource use implies a reduction of export opportunities for 
their commodities, this will at least be received with mixed feelings, unless forgone export 
earnings are fully compensated in another way. Similar disagreement will arise with regard to 
adjustment category nr. 1. Because of fierce competition in overcrowded international 
commodity markets a constant pressure on commodity prices exists, translating itself in 
pressure on production costs. To the extent that alternative, environment-friendly production 
techniques and related policies conflicts with the need to lower production costs, their intro-
duction will severely be hampered. Unless, again, they would be compensated for additional 
costs. 
1) Biophysical economists (e.g. Georgescu-Roegen, Costanza, Daly, Cleveland) consider this category of adjust-
ments as a too optimistic and partial solution for resource depletion and increasing entropy levels. (Qeveland 1987; 
Daly 1989). 
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4. THE 'NON-POLLUTER GETS PAID' PRINCIPLE AND INTEGRATION 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES 
From these observations it can be derived that to arrive internationally at a different, sustain-
able growth model adoption of the following guidelines is required for Third World commod-
ity exporters: 
* developing countries need further growth of income and consumption per capita; 
* to the extent that retrenchment of natural resource use leads to reduction of Third 
World commodity exports, the latter countries should be monetary compensated for 
lost earnings and for the costs of diversifying their export basis; 
* incremental production costs associated with introduction of ecologically more optimal 
production techniques or additional measures for environment protection. ' 
Implementing these guidelines, which represent the "Non-Polluter Gets Paid" (NPGP) princi-
ple, should be tied to a transitional period. Given the wide dispersion of income levels among 
countries, the period could be fairly long for some primary commodity-dependent countries. 
Moreover, implementation of the NPGP principle-should be shaped in such a form that it 
doesn't destroy the incentive for the country (and its producers) to change their export base 
in an ecologically more optimal way. 
Market failure 
Basically, the principle has two components: an adjustment component, and a financing and 
redistribution component. When OECD countries (and possibly some OPEC countries and 
NIC's) would consider it purely as a financing instrument, their contribution would be consid-
ered as a voluntary addition to their development aid. The supplement could have the form of 
balance of paymcnt support, project aid and/or technical assistance. Future proportions of 
the contribution would be exposed to the same budgetary arbitrariness as other national 
dcvelopment aid budgets, even if funds are channeled via multilateral organizations. They 
would remain a gift rather than representing a contractual obligation to pay the full price in a 
trade transaction. Commodity markets would continue to function in such a way that prices 
do not reflect the full social cost of production, and that OECD consumers gratuitously reap 
a part of producing countries' welfare. Technological and organisational innovation would 
continue to receive wrong price incentives. Environmentally undesirable consumption pat-
terns persist because prices do not reflect real costs. ' The economie signal system emits 
misleading hints. 
1) In the case of reducing chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) emissions, harmful for the ozone layer, this principle has 
already been accepted in intergovernmental negotiations. 
2) Galtung's (1990) proposes to shorten pollution chains for consumers, so that these chains become more visible 
and tangibie. He illustrates this by a provoking, but clarifying proposal to make it obligatory that exhaust pipes of 
cars end inside the car insted of outside. The motivation to buy only clean cars would be greatly enhanced ! 
8 
Integration of environmental extemalities 
Adjustments necessary for sustainable development can be brought about by regulating 
output or inputs, supplemented by creating monitoring and policing institutions. It would 
introducé many aspects of a command economy with all its rigidities, efficiency losses, and 
disincentives for technological innovation. If, however, the capitalist market economy is to 
remain the dominant allocation system, as seems to be the political spirit of the age, then 
policies for sustainable development must be concerned about internalising environmental 
extemalities. Adjustments will have to be brought about by price incentives from markets, 
either at the cost side or at the revenue side. Commodities produced by ecologically more 
sound techniques must either fetch a price premium or a cost advantage. Economie theory 
offers two main approaches for internalizing environmental extemalities. Both are based on 
the "Polluter Pays" principle. 
The first method is associated with Pigou's (1920) proposal to impose 'corrective' taxes by 
government so that private agents incorporate in their decisions the effect of their actions on 
others. Application of this remedy is not very promising with regard to Third World commod-
ity exports. A pivotal condition - the existence of robustly operating government and tax 
system - is not satisfied, because there is a multiplicity of governments and tax systems. A 
second problem is that some form of transfer to the damaged parties will be needed in order 
to prevent an undesired lowering of total output by individual action of the producing agents. 
(Pezzey 1988:204-205). Furthermore, who are to be regarded as damaged parties, given the 
fact that it is the structure of international commödity trade that prevents Third World 
producers from demanding a price that reflects the Ml social cost. In the short term indus-
tries and consumers in importing nations are benefïciaries of transferred welfare from pro-
ducing countries, so that the latter (i.e. the 'polluters') are to be compensated. ' Pigovian 
taxes will not end the environmental externality, when producers take the tax costs for their 
own account. Whether this happens or not depends on market form and costs of alternative 
techniques. This hints at a final problem, the question at what level corrective taxes should be 
fixed so that the undesired externality will be halted. Brown Weiss (1988) pleaded for institut-
ing international tolls on the use of common resources like seas, oceans, and air.The propor-
tions of this toll are somewhat arbitrary, and the connection between pollution creation and 
the costs of environmental protection is only indirectly established. In Brown Weiss's proposal 
the revenues are to be used for financing clean energies and monitoring agencies. 
A second cluster of approaches towards intemalisation of extemalities is mostly associated 
with an article of Coase (1960). His proposition, labeled by others as Coase's theorem, is that 
bargaining among agents over allowable levels of extemalities achieves efficiency without 
detailed intervention of a central government. To attain that situation a government should 
1) Paraphrasing Keynes ("In the long run we all are dead") national boundaries become irrelevant in the long term, 
because both country categories loose from environmental destruction. 
9 
take two steps. It has in some way or another to privatise the rights to use its amenities •', 
thereby ending its public good character. Also, it has to guarantee that negotiation about 
exploitaüon of these rights is costless, so that it does not involve transaction costs for any 
party. 
The Coasian approach may be useful in some ways to alleviate the 'tragedy of the commons'. 
For our aim it does not seem appropriate, however, since it presupposes a national govern-
ment that takes care for legal entitlements and liability rules for individual producers. (Berge 
1990). In the world market there is no such supranational authority and generally accepted 
legal order. Neither property rights for (use of) the environment nor the claimant status of 
damaged parties are internationally acknowledged. Even if would, the second step (eliminat-
ing transaction costs for individual negotiations) could turn out to be very expensive. Widely 
diverging bargaining power positions in international commodity market would have to be 
smoothed. ' Finally, Coase's approach has been criticized because of it presupposes that 
bargaining parties take a long-term view and are not chasing short-term gains (Cooter 1989). 
For our purpose the main flaw of both traditional approaches is their national orientation and 
the basic presupposition of central (government) authority that is able to function as a unity. 
Internationally this precondition does not apply. In the sphere of regulations on specific topics 
the function of an integrative central authority could be reached by intergovernmental agree-
ments and covenants. As long as the United Nations do not have a supranational status, 
international treaties and covenants are the only possible way. Some progress has been made 
among industrialised OECD countries and European Community members, e.g. national 
fishing quota, national quota for chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions. In OECD countries a 
largc number of environmental policy instruments associated with the "Polluter Pays" princi-
ple are being developed. (Opschoor & Vos 1989). Internationally, such instruments are non-
existent so far. A main stumbling block for international treaties that apply the "Polluter Pays" 
principle is probably the distribution of income among nations. Problems occur when they are 
to be extended to countries in very different states of development and different priorities 
with respect to environment and protection of natural resources. (Opschoor 1990). In this 
situation it seems more promising to endeavour to conclude international treaties incorporat-
ing the "Non-Polluter Gets Paid" principle. 
With regard to primary commodities international treaties regulating this trade do not have to 
start from scratch. A tradition of toughly negotiated international commodity agreements 
1) This could be done by pollution taxes, by auction of pollution permits, and by distributing licenses that specify a 
a maximal pollution emission per company. (Siebert 1987:91-98; Pezzey 1988). 
2) The 'Coase theorem' states that the allocative result of negotiations will be independent from the initial distribu-
tion of property rights. It has been criticised because the negotiation result is not independent from income distri-
bution between parties. It is evident that between trading agents in a given commodity chain wide differences in 
negotiation power can coexist, e.g. between large transnational trading companies, local govemments or marketing 
boards, and small farmers. Correction of these differences by a government can be expected to be expensive. 
Moreover, there is no intrinsic reason to limit the set of parties that are damaged by externalities, to only produc-
tion units. A similar status could be claimed e.g. for forest inhabitants whose existence and territory is distressed by 
limber production. 
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exists. An important characteristic of those agreements is that they established links between 
production, consumption, and trade conditions of specific primary commodities. The rest of 
this paper will be devoted to possibilities for internalising of environmental externalities in 
international commodity prices by similar international agreements. 
Environmental premium 
Though powerful ecology movements hardly exist in most Third World countries, their gov-
ernments are more and more aware of the need to minimize damage to the environmental 
resource base that supports their commodity exports. Given the need to continue the flow of 
export earnings, better environmental care will have to come primarily from the use of ecolog-
ically more optimal production techniques that have already been developed elsewhere. In 
agricultural and forestry technology increasing attention has been given to the development of 
non-chemical forms of pest management (integrated pest management) , 'green' fertilizers to 
replace (most) chemical fertilizers, harvest rotation, use of low-input varieties, mulching, 
integration of agriculture and forestry (agro-forestry), and systematic reforestation. In hilly 
areas economie self-interest and ecology can be combined by helping farmers shift from grain 
to tree crops by providing them with advice, equipment, and marketing assistance. (Ghatak 
1988; Pearce et all. 1990). Sometimes it will be necessary to supplement commodity produc-
tion with additional production to neutralise harmful effects, like sewerage systems, water 
cleaning and other forms of waste clearance, anti-erosion dikes and other sedimentation 
techniques. Irrigation techniques can often be optimised so that better use made of available 
water resources. (Barbier 1990). 
In mining, especially in developed countries with stiffer ecological norms, exploitation tech-
niques have been developed and applied that do less harm to the environment: construction 
of waste water reservoirs; air and water cleaning; refilling of open-pit mines; various forms of 
erosion abatement, like storage and reconstruction of removed top soils; systematic reforesta-
tion. 
Existence and feasibility of alternative techniques can only be established on a commodity-by-
commodity basis, often with necessary region-specific modifications. This being done, it is 
possible to establish how alternative production techniques influence initial investment and 
operating costs, relative to current techniques. ' More probable than not, such alternatives 
will demonstrate to be more expensive, because additional cost elements are included while 
not being matched by a proportional increase in productivity. A price premium for commodi-
ties produced in this way is required to cover extra costs, specifically for the recurrent ele-
ment of extra costs. For brevity's sake this price premium will be labeled environmental 
premium. A practical form of internalisation of externalities would be to get this premium 
included in the commodity's world market price. 
1) A range of alternatives may have to be considered. A study of a large number of Canadian mining sites for non-
ferrous metals over the period 1951-1974 evaluated the economie effects of water pollution control for 'Standard' 
and 'best-possible' techniques. pollution control measures necessary under the prevailing governmental regulations 
amounted to 3-10 per cent of total mine investment and 2-5 per cent of operating costs. However, if the best possi-
ble water treatment schemes (given known technology) would be employed, the figures would rise to 13 per cent of 
total investment and 8 per cent of operating costs. (Blunden 1985:53). 
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When it comes to apphcation of an environmental premium, the question arises whether it 
should be a generic or a differentiated mark-up on the 'free market' commodity price. A 
differentiated level could reflect different rates of cost increase in various producing coun-
tries, but it would at the same time introducé redistributive elements. In order to keep inter-
ference with market prices as limited as possible a differentiated level is less desirable. Be-
sides, it would require additional administration and bureaucracy. A generic level of the 
environmental premium, with the same nominal proportions for all countries, is preferable, 
therefore. It has to be recognised that, for two reasons, a generic premium level works out 
differently for various producing countries. Firstly, there will be differences in ecological side 
effects of production in various countries. In some countries a generic premium will not 
completely compensate all incremental costs abatement of pollution and other undesired side 
effects of commodity production. At the same time, a generic price increase will in some 
countries overcompensate such cost increments, thus contributing to a higher average profit 
margin for these exporters. This differential effect reflects comparative ecological advan-
tages. ' These cannot be expected to correlate in a systematic way with production scale. Yet 
in a second way does a generic environmental premium on the world market price work out 
differently for various exporting countries. This is a consequence of economies of scale in 
pollution abatement. To the extent that alternative technologies are characterised by indivisi-
bilities and cause discrete additions to fixed investment requirements, large scale producers 
enjoy the advantage of sinking fixed unit costs. This is illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 on basis 
of a random numerical example. In Figure 1 (next page) the magnitude of the environmental 
premium is fixed in such a way that the relation between average unit costs (AC1, AC2) and 
world market price (P1,P2) is left unaltered for the marginal producers, i.e. those exporting 
15,000 units per year. The black bars (old situation) and crosshatched bars (new situation) 
indicate unit profit margins, and show economies of scale in pollution abatement. In Figure 2 
the level is determined by the principle that the profit margin for the 'average' producers (say 
those producing 25,000 units annually) should be left unaltered. The unit price in the second 
case is slightly lower thus causing some marginal producers to drop out. Depending on the 
relative weight of fixed costs in pollution abatement, and depending on the supply conditions, 
this very effect may bring policy-makers to choose for the first option. 
1) Differential effects on profit margin tends to stimulate production in countries with a comparative ecological 
advantage, and thus invokes a change in international supply conditions of the commodity. On the other hand, the 
eventual form of the IECA should be such that it does not form an incentive for exporteis with a relative disadvan-
tage to dismiss cost-increasing pollution abatement and other environment preservation measures. 
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5. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 
In a situation where many debt-ridden Third World countries compete each other with the 
same commodities and try to increase their export volumes, it will be hard to realize the 
environmental premium. International trading houses, manufacturing firms, and other im-
porters in developed countries skillfully play the 'Divide et Impera'-game, thus contributing to 
the same effect. The free market solution seems to offer meagre prospects. International 
arrangements and market regulation form a prerequisite for internalisation of the environ-
mental premium. 
International commodity agreements belong to the scarce institutional forms for regulation of 
international markets. For some commodities (wheat, tin) international arrangements were 
already in function before World War II, though most of them stem from the 1970s. Usually 
two types of these intergovernmental agreements are discerned: those with, and those without 
economie mechanisms (like manipulatable bufferstocks and quota systems). The former are 
called formal agreements and aim at stabilising the world market price of the commodity. 
Moreover, and this they have in common with informal agreements, they specify guidelines 
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for exchange of (statistical) information on production, trade flows and consumption of the 
commodity, and for promotion of new commodity applications. 
At the 1976 Nairobi Unctad conference some agreement was reached on an Integrated 
Programme on Commodities (IPC) that should (1) improve the position of Third World 
commodity producers and, at the same time, (2) stabilise commodity prices. It would contain 
an $ 11 billion common fund to finance buffer stocks to support - by an equal number of 
formal commodity agreements - the prices of some 19 primary commodities. (Later on this 
was reduced to ten 'core' commodities). The atmosphere in which the original agreement was 
reached, was certainly influenced by the successful actions of OPEC and high prices for many 
other commodities. OECD countries were most interested in the second objective. From a 
theoretic angle the potential dissonance between both objectives was pointed out in an early 
phase. ' As time went on disagreement increased on the relative weight of both objectives. 
When, with a time lag of ten years, the common fund' became ratified by the required 
minimum number of countries and received the required minimal amount of pledges for funds, 
its proportions had been reduced drastically (to about $ 0.5 billion). Formal agreements were 
concluded for sugar, coffee, natural rubber, cocoa and tin. Most of them have been discontin-
ued since then. Disagreement between producing countries and/or non-participation of 
important consumer countries led to disintegration of the cocoa and coffee agreements. In 
1991 the only remafning effective formal agreement is the International Natural Rubber 
Agreement. 
The collapse of the International Tin Agreement in October 1985 revealed painfully that it is 
impossible to maintain a stable reference price at a high level against secular market trends. 
The financial burden of increasing bufferstock proportions increases beyond the level that not 
only consumption countries but also producing countries are prepared to carry. The last 
agreements for cocoa and rubber both included a mechanism for periodic adjustment of the 
reference price to 'free' market prices. Falling commodity prices ' and subsequent balance of 
payment problems of many producing countries during the 1980s placed the need for stabiü-
sation of export earnings again on the international agenda. Rather than returning to the 
original commodity agreements, there is increasing support for the vision that stabiüsation of 
export eamings is better served by international compensation arrangements. Examples exist 
in the form of the IMF Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility and the Stabex 
arrangement of the Lomé Treaty. Both offer financial compensation for loss of export earn-
ings due to commodity prices fluctuations. 
In spite of their decreasing international popularity it must be recognised that international 
1) Only under special conditions will measures for price stabiüsation simultaneously increase or stabilize incomes 
of producers in developing countries. "Our main conclusion is that price stabiüsation schemes have limited efficacy 
in stabiüzing the real spendable income of producing countries and that most of the other benefits associated with 
the stabilization schemes are transfer benefïts which, in many cases, seem to benefit the consuming countries at the 
expense of the producing countries." (Newbery & Stiglitz 1981:39-40). 
2) In 1989 the average real price of non-fuel commodities from developing countries was only 78 percent of its 1980 
level. (IMF 1990:27). 
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commodity agreements belong to the very scarce international institutions capable of estab-
lishing direct links between consumption, trade and production. This capacity makes them 
potentially useful instruments for integration of environmental issues. 
Up to now only one commodity agreement, namely the International Tropical Timber 
Agreement, explicitly includes environmental aspects. In the timber agreement member 
countries are encouraged "to support and develop industrial tropical timber reforestation and 
forest management activities". Another of its seven objectives is "to encourage the develop-
ment of national policies aimed at sustainable utilisation and conservation of tropical forests 
and their genetic sources, and at maintaining the ecological balance in the regions 
concerned". (UNCTAD 1983:2). For the realisation of these objectives R&D projects in the 
field of reforestation are promoted, while one of its three subcommittees concerns itself with 
reforestation and forest management. The Agreement encourages member countries only on 
a voluntary basis to promote environmental protection and reforestation. It includes no provi-
sions for directly linking costs of forest reconstruction and timber prices. The need for such 
instruments is becoming evident, since deforestation continues worldwide with little regard to 
operational forest management and sustainable timber production. (Poore 1989). 
Integration of environmental protection elements in such agreements can be extended beyond 
the terms included in the timber agreement. Intergovernmental negotiations could be used to 
find agreement on integration in commodity prices of an environmental premium to cover 
costs of alternative production techniques or environmental reconstruction expenses in 
producing countries. To distinguish this new type of agreements from earlier experiences we 
propose to label them International Environment and Commodity Agreements (IECAs). A 
number of preliminary steps are necessary before International Environment and Commodity 
Agreements (IECAs) can become active. The can be ordered in two phases, a research phase 
and a negotiation phase. 
Preliminary steps 
During the research phase rather detailed technical and economie studies are required relat -
ing to ecology, production and functioning of markets for a specific commodity. Five sub-
themes can be specified: 
a. Inventarisation and quantification of ecological effects of its export production. Effects 
will be formulated in terms of several relevant indicators and measures (continuous or 
discrete) that are relevant for this commodity. (e.g. Nijkamp 1989; Nash & Bowers 
1988). 
b. Assessment of relevant alternative production techniques and additional measures that 
would limit the most important negative environmental effects, with an indication (on 
purely technical criteria) of a time path for implementation. 
c. Appraisal of economie effects of alternative production techniques and additional 
measures, with regard to production costs and production volumes. This has to include 
a tentative assessment of effects on import requirements, employment and production 
regions. For the best alternative techniques the incremental cost price relative to costs 
under current techniques has to be established, thus indicating the magnitude of the 
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gross price markup that will be necessary. Incremental cost effects in some important 
export countries must be estimated. 
d. Investigation of probable substitution effects that may occur in consuming countries 
and industries as a consequences of the estimated gross price markup. 
e. Assessment of the optima! form in which the environmental premium is to be institutio-
nalised, i.e. import levy or export tax (elaborated in a later section), and formulation of 
proposals for procedures, checks, monitoring agencies, and fund management. 
For the four first sub-themes it may be necessary to differentiate between the main producing 
countries. The study on fourth sub-theme should specifically pay attention to the reaction of 
all relevant economie agents. From the point of view of consumers the price markup, in 
whichever form it is levied, functions as a turnover tax on the international price of the 
commodity. Because of the small part of commodity prices in the costs of most final products, 
substitution effects on the consumer side tend to be small. Most substitution effects may be 
expected from manufacturing agents and large importers. How price elasticity affects their 
demand for the commodity has to be estimated by considering cross elasticities for viable 
substitutes. 
On basis of reports on ecological effects (a), technical-economic studies (b,c) and expected 
market reactions (d) proposals have to be put forward with regard to implementation priori-
ties of alternative techniques and the associated level of the environmental premium. In the 
fïfth sub-study attention it should be considered if and how the Common Fund for Commodi-
ties and Unctad's IPC programme could facilitate introduction of an International Environ-
ment and Commodity Agreement. 
Negotiation issues 
The negotiation phase builds upon the results and proposals of the first phase. Most probably, 
the studies will contain a number of variants rather than clear-cut, unambiguous conclusions 
on the issues involved. Across various diverging interests - between producing and consuming 
nations, between producing countries with different production conditions, between ecologi-
cal action groups, governments, and established interests in commodity chains (like transna-
tional companies) - agreement has to be reached on a number of issues. The most important 
of them are: 
* Decision criterion for determining the magnitude of the environmental premium . If a 
generic premium level is preferred, it has to be decided which reference countries will be 
used for determining the increase in average units costs due to alternative techniques, and the 
required price mark-up. Should the premium level be such that marginal producers are kept 
in the market or should 'average' producers be taken as benchmark. 
* Levels of unacceptable ecological damage. Which types and levels (for all relevant crite-
ria) of negative environmental externalities should be abated ? Discussion can be expected on 
policy-induced versus 'average technology'-induced ecological damage (elaborated on in a 
following section). 
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* Magnitude of the environmental premium. Having established the reference countries, 
the ecological effects that have to be neutralised, the incremental costs (given known technol-
ogies), it is possible to fïx the level of the environmental premium. Some other considerations 
may enter the discussion, however. 
For producing nations a trade-off exists between ecological damage and the potential loss of 
export earnings which is likely given a certain price elasticity of commodity demand. Their 
attitude depends among other things on the availability export diversification alternatives. 
For consuming nations a trade-off exists between current cheap commodity supply versus 
tolerating further ecological damage in producing countries that bolsters future threats to the 
global ecosystem.lt is to be expected that on some issues their tolerance levels will be lower, 
namely in cases where immediate health damage may be caused in consuming nations, e.g. 
due to pesticide residues in agricultural commodities. 
* Indicator of reference price. If the level of the environmental premium is fixed on basis 
of average price-cost margins in the situation before introduction of alternative techniques, 
then it has to be decided which price indicator will serve as reference price. One could use an 
existing, internationally used price indicator at certain agreed point in time or a weighted 
international price trend that is calculated in an agreed way. Also the frequency of adjustment 
to new reference price levels has to be decided upon. 
* Finally, governments must achieve an agreement on a number of questions relating to 
the institiitional form in which the price markup will be introduced (import surcharge, export 
tax or other forms). Associated with this conclusion are decisions on monitoring system, 
govemment representation, and sanction procedures to guarantee that the price premium will 
be paid and that resulting extra earnings will be allocated to expenses for environmental 
reconstruction and conservation as agreed upon in the agreement. Finally, some dynamic 
procedures ' must be endorsed. 
The negotiation process draws heavily on a well-understood long-term self interest of nations. 
The most important divergences of opinion will probably spring from short-term interests and 
regional or country-group egoism. An essential negotiation element will be how to cope with 
free riders. If countries systematically share the benefits of an International Environment and 
Commodity Agreement (IECA) without carrying part of its burden, this forms a time bomb 
under the agreement. Free-ridership can occur both between countries and within countries. 
Handling this problem will be a important determinant in the choice of the eventual institu-
tional form of the IECA. 
1) The magnitude of the price markup is determined by several variables of a dynamic nature: technical innovation 
(feasible alternative production methods), changes in the international reference price, and price developments of 
commodity substitutes. As part of a monitoring system a subcommittee of the International Environment and 
Commodity Agreements may be charged with a permanent review of ecological, technological, and economie condi-
tions in the commodity branch. The subcommittee could periodically present proposals on necessary adjustments 
of the price markup. 
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Import levy and other implementation altematives 
The environmental price mark-up can be levied in several forms, each having its own advan-
tages and disadvantages. Because it is a premium on top of a 'given' world market price, and 
because regards a form of international redistribution, it seems obvious to charge this levy 
when commodities pass a border. This may be the border of the exporting country or that of 
the (ultimate) importing country. In the first case it has the form of an export tax, in the latter 
case it is an import toll. 
The export tax variant has two less attractive implications. One implication is that commodity-
importing Third World countries will also face a higher import bill. If the international 
community agrees on the principle that most of the financial burden of the environmental 
reconstruction and conservation will have to be borne by the OECD countries, additional 
measures have to be taken. The most direct way to elaborate this principle could be a com-
pensatory fund. ' Secondly, guarantees have to be created against free riding by exporting 
countries. Free riding behaviour can occur by either not levying the export tax (to secure extra 
market share) or by using the revenues for other purposes. Since these funds are fungible, it 
is tempting to simply add them to general profits of the exporting companies, or to general 
public revenues. To prevent such forms of free riding the IECA Secretariat (or an auditing 
committee of it) should have the right to inspect: 
(a) exporting companies, to check whether the price markup is actuaUy charged by the export-
er and whether these revenues were reserved and used for the right purposes. Moreover, the 
origin of exported commodities has to be verified, in order to prevent misuse by reexport or 
blending of commodities from countries where no export tax is levied. 
(b) financial transactions of producing countries' national govemment related to the export 
tax. The auditing task would be facilitated by creation of a special account or administrative 
body for transfer of funds from the price markup. 
(c) production locations, to verify whether ecologically more sound production techniques and 
processes are being implemented. 
The inspection committee or IECA secretariat would report any irregularity and would 
formulate proposals for corrective steps to the govemment of the exporting country. Some 
arbitration and sanction rules will be required. If a govemment and the IECA don't reach 
agreemtn a problem arises. ' 
A preliminary conclusion may be that implementation in the form of export taxes is marred 
by additional measures and international bureaucracy. Auditing procedures may easily inter-
fere with national sovereignty feelings of producing countries. None of these problems arise 
1) The fund could be fed by direct contributions of OECD members and more developed NICs, or by transfer of 
part of export tax revenue from the exporting countries. Contributions could be proportional to either their ex-
pons or imports of the commodity. Management, proportions, and drawing right are to be settled separately. 
2) Juridical enforcement of IECA-rules is only possible by a litigation in a court in the country with which a dispute 
exists. Internationally, only arbitrage (e.g. for the International Court of Justice in The Hague) can be hoped for. 
(Cf. Stein & Grenville-Wood 1985). However, juridical enforcement seems not the most appropriate way to regu-
late an escalated major conflict, as actual economie functioning of the IECA in many cases will be enfeebled before 
a settlement is reached. 
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with the import levy variant. 
Charging the environmental premium at the border of importing countries makes it possible 
to charge only OECD countries, and perhaps some NICs and OPEC countries. The import 
surcharge should be commodity-specifïc and will have to be paid by importers in commodity-
importing developed countries. They pay a fixed amount per quantity imported to the fiscal 
authorities of their national government ' . By levying on a generic basis on all imported 
quantities, the need to check for origins (due to re-export) is eliminated. It also thwarts the 
incentive for free-ridership on the side of exporting countries. Governments of importing 
countries periodically transfer the revenues from the surcharge to a special environment fund, 
administered by the IECA board. Exporting countries and a statistical department of the 
IECA secretariat together assess annual total export volume and its country destinations. On 
basis of this, with a correction for re-exports, the gross payable amount for each importing 
country is easily assessed. Free riding by importing countries will be difficult. Governments of 
producing countries can make drawings from environment fund, with maximal drawing rights 
proportional to their export volume. Definitive remittance of allotted funds is dependent 
upon the content and soundness of the proposals put forward by governments. The financing 
proposals formulated by governments (perhaps on behalf of exporting companies in their 
country) concern specifïc projects for additional investments in ecology-friendly production 
methods, subsidy programmes for use of alternative production methods or inputs ' , and 
local environmental preservation projects in commodity-producing areas. The IECA could 
offer technical, organisational and economical assistance to governments to help them formu-
lating feasible proposals for funding. Evaluation of project proposals by the IECA could be 
based on: expected ecological effect, technical and organisational feasibility, effectiveness of 
earlier fund disbursements to the country. •* 
In current economie practice initiatives for creation of import levies for environmental pur-
poses have seen their debut. It regards the European tropical timber trade, which is feeling . 
European timber trade organizations, feeling a growing public pressure to limit import of 
tropical hardwoods. Timber traders are themselves becoming increasingly aware of the fact 
that future tropical timber sources become insecure, as countries like the Philippines have 
already abandoned timber exports. (Blackwell 1991). Now organisations of timber importers 
in several European countries (e.g. United Kingdom, Netherlands) are becoming aligned with 
1) Customs clearance in the port of entry should be the determining criterion. It avoids troubles with differences 
between physical and non-physical (futures) trade. 
2) In case of commodities where production is dominated by small scale producers, governments need programmes 
that offer subsidies for implementation for specifïc production methods and inputs. In the implementation of such 
programmes land extension services or local authorities can play a role. To the extent that production methods and 
or input use during production can be diagnosed in the product itself (e.g. Chemical residues) commercial channels 
in the country (purchasing companies, exporters) can play a useful role in distributing the premium to producers 
that apply the beneficial production techniques. The ecological properties of the product, possibly in the form of a 
hall-mark, become a regular quality attribute along with other quality characteristics. 
3) Evaluation procedures should be as short as possible, with limited bureaucracy. Use of contracted experts by the 
IECA secretariat could serve this objective. 
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som e environment conservation groups in lobbying their governments for a surcharge on the 
import prices of tropical hardwood. This surcharge (extra import levy) will be used to fund -
through the International Tropical Timber Organization - the development of sustainable 
tropical timber resources. If such a system comes into existence exporting countries can make 
drawings from this fund for reforestation projects. 
Compared to the one based on export taxes the import levy variant has as relative disadvan-
tage that the connection between commodity export production and implementation of envi-
ronment-preserving techniques becomes less directly. Internalisation of environmental exter-
nalities in world commodity prices is accomplished in an indirect way. This relative disadvan-
tage is, however, more than compensated by being relatively easy applicable and by limiting 
possibilities for free riding. 
Success of International Environment and Commodity Agreements (IECAs) will partly 
depend on some product and market characteristics. The commodity must have a certain 
degree of homogeneity regarding quality and variety. The main producing and consuming 
nations must participate in the agreement, so that market transactions outside the sphere of 
the IECA can be limited in magnitude and number. Stable supply conditions must prevail, so 
as to avoid sharp discrepancies between (a) the interests of traditional producers and new-
comers, and (b) shafply diverging production costs in the different producing countries. The 
demand side of the international market should have some stability. Dominating market 
positions of large trading houses or commodity speculators that benefit from the continuation 
of highly volatile prices are an unfavourable factor. Strong volatility of prices creates extra 
problems for assessing levels and total amounts of environmental price levies. In cases where 
supply and demand side of the commodity market are dominated by one or a small number of 
transnational corporations regulating a large part of international transactions on an intra-
company or semi-intracompany base (i.e. by vertical integration or long-term supply con-
tracts) some extra audit measures by the IECA board will be required. This situation would 
not necessarily constraint success, provided that a comparison is possible with an accepted 
international arm's length price, and provided that involved governments have adequate sta-
tistical or customs services for monitoring their international trade, so that the freedom to 
manipulate intracompany prices is limited. 
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6. DEPLETABLE RESOURCES AND POLICY-INDUCED EXTERNALITIES 
The IECA model which has been described so far, only takes into account current costs for 
environmental protection and reconstruction. It does not offer a solution for depletion of 
non-renewable resources, though this issue is important in the cases of tropical timber * and 
mining products. Non-renewables have intentionally been left out of consideration for both 
theoretical and practical reasons. Assessment of the optimal depletion path implies a number 
of highly disputable valuation questions. One concerns intergenerational equity: how should 
time preference of current consumers be valuated against the demands of all future genera-
tions ? How should the latter be discounted ? In which way will future generations deal with 
the skewed historic-geographical distribution of the consumption of depletable natural re-
sources ? What are the current value implications of future technical innovations in recycling, 
material-saving and the use of non-scarce natural substitutes ? Even without these issues 
accomplishment of IECAs will put a strain on international willingness to compromise, and 
on the long-term vision of national governments in producing and importing countries. In 
order to avoid a paralysing international dispute on these matters, it seems preferable to 
make a start with a price markup that allows current suboptimal techniques to be discarded 
or minimised in the production of primary commodities in developing countries. If experience 
with IECAs is satisfying, an atmosphere may be created in which it is possible to reach inter-
national agreement on price markups or other instruments that expHcitly deal with economie 
valuation of non-renewable resources. 
Apart from the non-renewables issue, discussion on IECAs will be complicated by similar 
existence of negative ecological externalities caused by market failure (public goods, absence 
of negative prices for pollution products) and those caused by wrong policy. International 
Environment and Commodity Agreements are set primarily for the first type of externalities 
and do not offer a solution for the second type. This is not to say, however, that the second 
type of externalities is not important in relation to the production of primary export commod-
ities. In many developing countries degradation of environmental quality is encouraged by 
and even subsided by local governments, some times in co-operation with foreign donors and 
companies. (Le Prestre 1989:170; Pearce et all. 1990; Gillis & Repetto 1987). 
The role of governments can differ very much between one commodity and another. Two 
poles can be discerned, between which a large number of mixed cases exists. On the one hand 
we find commodities of which production is based on concessions given out by governments. 
This is often found in mining and forestry. Government policies that regard deforestation or 
mining development primarily as economie extension projects, and accordingly subsidise 
them, without much regard of ecological aspects, cause negative environmental externalities 
1) It is not so certain that tropical timber can be regarded as a renewable resource, like for instance is true in case 
of most coniferous timber varieties. This incertainty sterns from the long growth cycle (40-150 years) for many 
popular tropical hardwood varieties, the vulnerable ecology of tropical rain forests, and widespread lack of success 
- except in case of teak - of attempts to regenerate the logged varieties. (Gillis et all 1987:522). 
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of a policy-induced nature.Large infrastructural projects by governments often explicitly aim 
at opening up natural landscapes and rain forests for concession areas. For instance in Gabon 
and Brazil this has contributed to ecological degradation of rain forests. Allotment of short-
term concession encourages short-term behaviour, submaintainance of the concession base, 
and neglect of lagged ecological consequences. In the case of concession-based commodity 
production governments have powerful and rather direct tools for compelling allottees to 
observe certain ecological conditions for exploitation. In Malaysia, for instance, the govern-
ment requires introduced a hall-mark for export timber, ensuring that concessionaires pro-
duced it by sustainable forestry methods. Ecological degradation of concession areas could be 
reduced by stricter control of concessionaires and prohibitive financial penalties in case of 
harmful exploitation. 
At the other extreme we find commodities predominantly produced by small, decentrally 
operating small producers, like is often the case with coffee and cocoa. Governmental grip on 
this type of commodity production is much more indirect, yet not absent. Via extension serv-
ices, marketing boards, pricing policy, subsidies for fertilisers, pesticides and high yielding 
varieties, and rural credit policy government already influences production conditions. This 
set of instruments - incentives and disincentives - can also be used to foster ecological preser-
vation. Existing commodity purchasing channels (exporters and. local merchants) can get a 
useful complementary role once if they can be persuaded to include ecological quality stand-
ards in their overall quality monitoring. ' Increasing the availability of rural credit at afford-
able rates and terms could reüeve ecological strain and allow proper investments in conserva-
tion, particularly for marginal farmers, that now often overexploit their soils and environment 
due to lack of (income) alternatives. Extension services could play an important role in dis-
semination of ecologically more appropriate techniques (e.g.integrated pest management, 
ploughing techniques) and more appropriate varieties. There is a role for governments in 
developing local agronomic research on more appropriate production techniques. 
An important consequence of growing international attention for environmental problems is 
probably that unwanted and unanticipated ecological effects of government policies in de-
veloping countries will be reduced in the future. The World Bank 'ecologised' its policy since 
1987 and now supports transfer of sustainable production technologies to Third World gov-
ernments. Given this change in awareness is can be expected that, internationally, the accent 
will shift more and more to environmental externalities that are caused by market failure, 
rather than wrong government policies. 
1) This could be facilitated when a governement would subsidise distribution of simple and cheap technical devices 
for testing of biocide residuals in products. For their support it is crucial that ecologically high quality products 
fetch a price premium. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
Damage to ecosystem in developing countries is often related to production of primary export 
commodities. Education and conscience-raising programs may increase awareness of side 
effects of production activities. But it will not necessarily stop negative environmental exter-
nalities associated with export production. Government policies for raising export income 
may even increase such effects, because environmental concern tends not to be put in the 
first place of their priority rankings. Economie growth and poverty abatement objectives are 
generally considered far more important, although ecological concern is manifestly increasing 
in most developing countries. Economie growth requifes investments and imports, for which 
foreign exchange earnings by primary commodities exports are vital in many developing 
countries. Given this need for a continuing flow of export earnings, introduction of more 
ecology-friendly production techniques will only be possible if producers would be compen-
sated for the extra costs of such techniques. This would require the adoption of the "Non-
Polluter Gets Paid" (NPGP) principle in international commodity trade between commodity-
exporting developing countries and industrialised countries. Growing awareness of transna-
tional threats to the global ecosystem increases the latter countries' willingness-to-pay for 
environmental preservation in vital areas like conservation of the world's stock of rain forests. 
Therefore, a climate is coming into existence in which adoption of the NPGP principle is 
becoming feasible. In international negotiations on ozone layer depleteion and global warm-
ing effect this principle is on the brink of being adopted. 
Apart from a generic application of the principle, e.g. in the form of a Climate Fund or a 
separate fund to help less developed countries ban CFC-gasses, it can also be used to inte-
grate environmental externalities in prices of primary export commodities. Commodity prices 
do not reflect real costs of environmental destruction, which is to a large extent due to market 
failure. In this paper it is argued that the NPGP principle could very well materialise in the 
creation of International Environment and Commodity Agreements (IECAs). Such agree-
ments would incorporate procedures and institutions for putting an environmental premium 
on top of existing commodity prices. This ecological mark-up would primarily be used to 
fïnance alternatives techniques and measures that allow environmental conservation and 
reconstruction in commodity producing areas. The most appropriate form for levying the 
environmental premium is probably that of an import surcharge in importing countries, but 
introduction of an IECA will require additional research for each specific commodity. Succes-
ful application of the NPGP principle in International Environment and Commodity Agree-
ments will function as an example for wider approach to integrate environmental externalities 
in world market prices. 
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9. SUMMARY 
Damage to ecosystem in developing countries is often related to production of primary export 
commodities. Awareness of negative side effects of commodity production is not a sufficiënt 
condition to reduce such practices. In developing nations environmental concern generally is 
not put in the first place of governments' priority rankings. Economie growth and poverty 
abatement objectives are considered far more important, even though ecological concern is 
manifestly increasing. Economie growth requires investments and imports, for which foreign 
exchange earnings by primary commodities exports are vital in many developing countries. 
Given this need for a continuing flow of export earnings, introduction of more ecology-friend-
ly production techniques will only be possible if producers would be compensated for the 
extra costs of such techniques. This would require the adoption of the "Non-Polluter Gets 
Paid" (NPGP) principle in international commodity trade between commodity-exporting 
developing countries and industrialised countries. Growing awareness of transnational threats 
to the global ecosystem increases the latter countries' willingness-to-pay for environmental 
preservation in vital areas like conservation of the world's stock of rain forests. Thefefore, a 
climate is coming into existence in which adoption of the NPGP principle is becoming feasi-
ble. Though several forms for application of the principle can be thought of, the paper pays 
special attention to an institutional form that integrates environmental externalities in prices 
of primary export commodities. Commodity prices received by developing countries, seldom 
reflect real costs of environmental destruction. By creation of International Environment and 
Commodity Agreements (IECAs) this situation could be changed. IECAs would incorporate 
procedures and institutions for putting an environmental premium on top of existing 
commodity prices. This ecological mark-up would primarily be used to fmance alternatives 
techniques and measures that allow environmental conservation and reconstruction in 
commodity producing areas. After describing some variants and limitations, the paper shows 
optimism about future chances for International Environment and Commodity Agreements. 
This application of the "Non-Polluter Gets Paid" principle could form a starting point for 
further integration of environmental externalities in international trade between industrialised 
countries and developing countries. 
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